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TAX FORECLOSURE: A DRAG ON COMMUNITY VITALITY OR 
A TOOL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
William Weber∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2005, Representative Sally Conway Kilbane 
introduced House Bill 294 into the Ohio House of Representatives.1  At 
that time, her district, which encompasses the City of Cleveland, was 
battling the abandonment of properties due to a shrinking population and 
an aging building stock.  The bill sought to reform the tax foreclosure 
system in Ohio to allow for an expedited administrative tax foreclosure 
process on abandoned, unoccupied properties.  The bill passed through 
the House and Senate and the Governor signed the bill into law in June 
of 2006.2  At the time, Representative Kilbane could not have predicted 
how important such a process would be to Cleveland with the subprime 
mortgage crisis quickly approaching.  Soon after the bill passed, a wave 
of mortgage foreclosures racked the Cleveland area and much of the 
nation.  As the foreclosure filings rose, so did the number of houses on 
the market.  As market prices dropped, it became less likely that 
foreclosing lenders would be able to collect on the debt they were owed.  
Many homes became lost in a legal limbo, with homeowners 
abandoning the property under foreclosure and the lenders refusing to 
take title to a home they could not sell and would have to maintain.  In 
the alternative, lenders may have taken title to the property, but sold it 
quickly, at a loss, to prospecting investors.  Frequently those investors 
proved to be irresponsible and neglectful property owners. 
Subsequently, a second revision to the tax foreclosure process 
allowed for strict foreclosure on unoccupied, abandoned land.  This 
revision became law when SB353 was signed by the Governor in 
January of 2009.3  Additionally, upon the bill’s passage, Cuyahoga 
County, the only county in Ohio permitted to do so at the time, was 
allowed to form what is now known as a county land reutilization 
 
 ∗ Associate Member, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Ohio Capitol Connection Bill History For HB294, HANNAH CAPITOL CONNECTION, 
http://www.rotundacollection.com/BillHistory.aspx?billnum=HB294&ga=5 (last visited June 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter Capitol Connection].  For additional information on Rep. Kilbane, see Sally Conway 
Kilbane, OHIO LADIES’ GALLERY http://www.ohioladiesgallery.org/PublicOfficial.aspx?personId=8356 
1 (last visited June 3, 2013). 
 2. Capitol Connection, supra note 1. 
 3. Bill Status and Legislative Activity, HANNAH CAPITOL CONNECTION, 
http://www.rotundacollection.com/viewBill.aspx?billnum=SB353&ga=17 (subscription required) (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2012). 
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corporation (CLRC) and use the new tax foreclosure process to its full 
extent.  The final component of the tax foreclosure process came in 
April of 2010 when the Governor signed HB313 into law.4  With the 
passage of this bill, Ohio created a state wide tool for tax enforcement 
and economic development.  Ultimately these bills blended several 
procedural components, found throughout the United States, and 
coupled the efficient foreclosure process with a county-wide 
redevelopment agency committed to minimizing abandonment and 
blight while concurrently instigating economic development. 
In order to better understand the rationale of this tax foreclosure 
process Part II of this article will explore the history of the property tax, 
the history of foreclosure, modern trends in tax foreclosure, and the 
legislative history of the current Ohio statutes.  In Part III this article 
will argue that objective facts show that the former process utilized for 
tax foreclosure was dysfunctional; that the revisions contain adequate 
safeguards to protect property owners’ rights; and that, though Ohio’s 
solution may be unique, the individual problems and policies behind the 
legislation are not new and can be found throughout the United States.  
Part IV of this article will conclude that Ohio has created a safe, 
effective tool to deal proactively with blight and abandonment and that 
similar legislation should be adopted throughout the United States. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of the Property Tax 
The property tax has managed to survive for centuries in the face of 
constant opposition.5  Described as the horseshoe crab of taxation,6 it 
has stubbornly survived as the original empires that created it have 
crumbled.  Though the idea of a property tax has been around for 
thousands of years,7 the property tax8 that we know today in the United 
States has its roots in the medieval feudal system.9  Despite frequent 
 
 4. Governor Signs Land Bank Legislation, HANNAH REPORT (Apr. 7, 2010), 
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/NewsStory.aspx?id=182288; OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 323.78 
(West 2012). 
 5. See Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 748 
(2000). 
 6. Dennis Hale, The Evolution of the Property Tax: A Study of the Relation Between Public 
Finance and Political Theory, 47 J. POL. 382, 383 (1985) (“The property tax is the horseshoe crab of 
revenue devices: primitive, puzzling, but perfectly adapted for survival.”). 
 7. Alexander, supra note 5, at 748. 
 8. The term “property tax” in this article refers to a tax levied upon real property.  This article 
does not address taxes levied upon tangible or intangible personal property. 
 9. See Hale, supra note 6, at 386. 
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criticism, property taxes have become entrenched in our government 
structure as a vital source of revenue for local governments.10  This is 
partially a result of the very nature of levying and collecting property 
taxes.  The administration and collection of property taxes requires a 
significant commitment of resources to identify properties subject to 
taxation and determine the value of those properties.11  This process 
requires local involvement, and therefore much of the administration 
and control of property taxes is frequently left to local government.  
Because of this reliable revenue stream, the operation of many local 
jurisdictions is dependent upon the revenues generated from property 
taxes.  One study found that in recent decades property taxes have 
comprised up to seventy-five percent of all tax revenues raised solely by 
local governments.12 
Overall, the procedural mechanisms for collecting on unpaid real 
property taxes vary greatly by jurisdiction.13  Generally, the process will 
involve a mix of assessing liens; sale of liens to third parties; judicial or 
power of sale foreclosure; and liquidation of the property by public sale 
in order to satisfy the debt owed.14  The challenges of the collection 
process are ancient, and even as far back as the Ptolemaic Egyptians and 
the ancient Greeks governments have been selling their tax debt to third 
party tax collectors who then handle collection.15  This process, known 
as “tax farming,”16 is an efficient method for those owed taxes to 
quickly get a discounted return on the debt they are owed, without 
having to expend resources in the collections process. Unfortunately, 
this practice may have unintended consequences, including setting the 
property on a path towards neglect and abandonment.17  The main 
alternative to tax farming is for the tax creditor to acquire a lien on the 
subject property and foreclose on that lien.18 Originally, when local 
 
 10. Alexander, supra note 5, at 753. 
 11. Id. at 748. 
 12. Id. at 755 (citing Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental Relations, 2 Significant Features 
of Fiscal Federalism 115 , 118 tbl. 64 (1992)). 
 13. Alexander, supra note 5, at 771.  See also JENS PETER JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 308 (1931) (“It is extremely difficult and precarious to reduce the innumerable details 
of the collection procedure to either a tabular or a textual statement. Even in a single state . . . where the 
practice has been adjusted to local whims and needs, some of which have lost their validity, the details 
defy description.”). 
 14. JENSEN, supra note 13, at 326. 
 15. Alexander, supra note 5, at 758.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 763 (“There is no assurance that the tax lien purchasers themselves, if they ultimately 
acquire the property at a tax foreclosure, will pay property taxes in subsequent years, or will adequately 
maintain the property.”). 
 18. Marie T. Reilly, The Case for the Tax Collector, 18 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 ART. 2, § 1 
(2009). 
3
Weber: Tax Foreclosure: A Drag on Community Vitality or a Tool for Econo
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1618 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
governments did not possess the administrative capacity they have 
today, the collection process was left to the local Sheriff, Treasurer, or a 
town tax collector who was paid on commission.19 Some jurisdictions 
even relied on private third parties to identify who was not paying 
taxes.20  Though numerous variations of the tax collection process exist, 
this article will focus on a common method employed by many 
jurisdictions.  The process involves the assessment on the property of a 
lien for unpaid property taxes, foreclosure proceedings on the lien, 
liquidation of the property at public auction, and the final division of 
proceeds amongst the creditors.21  Generally, tax liens receive first 
preference, and as a result, the government receives compensation 
before any other creditor.22  This grant of priority is grounded in the 
simple fact that taxation is crucial to the existence of government.23 
B. History of Foreclosure on Real Property 
Looking at the history of foreclosure helps to better explain the 
various modern tax lien foreclosure processes.  The process of 
foreclosure first developed in feudal England in relation to mortgages.24  
At that time the primary structure used for mortgages involved a 
conveyance of the title to the land to the mortgagee upon the condition 
that the mortgagor would regain title to the property if the mortgagor 
complied with the terms of the mortgage and repaid the mortgagee on a 
set date.25  If the mortgagor could not or did not repay the full amount 
owed on the date set, then the mortgagor lost all claim to the property 
and the mortgagee retained title, regardless of the value of the property 
in comparison to the debt.26  This inflexible system sometimes led to 
harsh results, so mortgagors began turning to the courts of equity to 
regain title.27  Over several centuries, the courts of equity developed the 
 
 19. Alexander, supra note 5, at 759. 
 20. Id.; see also JENSEN, supra note 13, at 353–54 (explaining the practice that developed in 
Ohio to privatizing tax assessment). 
 21. Alexander, supra note 5, at 772 (“In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions enforcement 
of the property tax lien involves a sale of the lien itself, or of the underlying property . . . .”). 
 22. Id. at 770 (“Most jurisdictions accord this ‘super-priority’ status to property tax liens as a 
matter of statute, though other jurisdictions have reached the same result as a matter of judicial 
decision.”); see Randall Thomsen, Washington State Property Tax Foreclosures: Quoerere Dat Sapere 
Quoe Sunt Legitima Vere, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 123, 142 (1996). 
 23. Alexander, supra note 5, at 770. 
 24. Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure By Sale as De Facto Strict 
Foreclosure—An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. 
REV. 850, 855 (1985). 
 25. Id. at 855–56. 
 26. Id. at 856. 
 27. Id. 
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doctrine known as the equity of redemption, which allowed a defaulting 
mortgagor a reasonable time to redeem ones property by paying the debt 
owed.28  This equitable right of redemption is still prevalent throughout 
the United States legal system.  Originally, all foreclosures were strict 
foreclosures, where after a foreclosure, the foreclosing party was 
granted title to the property instead of going through a sale of the 
property.29  Strict foreclosure was the primary form of foreclosure in 
England until the mid-nineteenth century.30  In the United States, strict 
foreclosure was largely abandoned in favor of foreclosure by sale.31  
There were several reasons for abandoning strict foreclosure.  First, 
American judges were less likely to grant the equitable remedies which 
protected mortgagors in England and therefore harsh results from strict 
foreclosure were more common.32  Furthermore, prices fluctuated 
quickly due to rapid growth and strict foreclosure did not match the title 
theory that was adopted widely in the American colonies.33  However, 
strict foreclosure did survive in the United States, partially in mortgage 
foreclosure law and partially in tax foreclosure law.34 
C. Modern Tax Foreclosure 
Though all states recognize the general process of assessing tax 
liens,35 the chosen methods for collection on those liens vary greatly.  
Each state’s collection method is a unique product of its history and 
culture.  One varying factor is the use of the judiciary.  According to one 
commentator, roughly half of the states allow enforcement of tax liens 
without any judicial involvement.36  Amongst the other states, the level 
of judicial involvement varies from full judicial foreclosure37 to a 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Wechsler, supra note 24, at 855–57.  
 30. Id. at 857–58. 
 31. Id. at 858. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  The title theory and lien theory dichotomy stems from early mortgage law.  The title 
theory of mortgages was the first to develop, when mortgages required that a mortgagee transfer title in 
fee simple to the mortgagor.  Under this theory the mortgage the mortgagee holds title to the property 
until the mortgage is satisfied.  The lien theory of mortgages, which developed out of the English Courts 
of Chancery, holds that the mortgagor holds title of the land and the mortgage is solely a lien on the 
property.  Each theory may have different implications for the respective parties rights.  LAWRENCE R. 
AHEARN, III, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8.2 (2012). 
 34. For example, Connecticut is a strict mortgage foreclosure jurisdiction. See CONN. AGENCIES 
REGS. § 49-21 (2012).  For additional information, see CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH LAW LIBRARY, 
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGES IN CONNECTICUT (2011), 
http://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/Notebooks/Pathfinders/Foreclosure.PDF. 
 35. Alexander, supra note 5, at 772.  
 36. Id. 
 37. See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 84.64.080 (2012) (requiring a full judicial foreclosure after a 
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confirmation of the sale at the end of the redemption period.38 
Generally, a common method for collection of foreclosure on the tax 
debt follows this path: notice to the property owner of the delinquency 
and pending sale, sale of either the underlying property or a tax lien 
certificate, a statutory redemption period where the owner may redeem 
the property, and finally a foreclosure of the owner’s right of 
redemption.39  Though a minority practice, strict foreclosure is still 
prevalent as a method of collection.40  Some states, as seen in the Ohio 
statute, have added special provisions to assist in economic development 
or deal with abandoned and vacant property.41 
Whatever the policy choices are that lead a state to decide upon a 
certain method of collection, each method has its own repercussions.  
For example, if a state allows an extended post-sale right of redemption 
period then the purchaser has little incentive to spend money on 
improving the property if the former owner can redeem the property.  
The purchaser risks losing his or her investment in the property since the 
former owner will likely be able to redeem for the amount of taxes 
owed, regardless of the recent investment by the purchaser. 
D. History of Current Ohio Statutes 
The current tax foreclosure process analyzed in this article was 
introduced by various Ohio legislators piecemeal over a span of several 
years.  Originally introduced in June 2005, HB294 sought to make the 
tax foreclosure process more efficient by allowing a county’s Board of 
Revisions to hear tax cases for unoccupied, abandoned property.42  By 
allowing these cases to be heard administratively, the foreclosure 
process could be expedited to take less than half a year, as opposed to 
the two or three years that such a proceeding could take under the 
previous law.43  During the senatorial hearings on the bill, a constant 
theme championed by proponents of the bill was the negative impact of 
abandoned buildings on a neighborhood, the inefficiencies of an 
overburdened judicial system, and the need for a quick and efficient way 
 
long delinquency period). 
 38. Alexander, supra note 5, at 773. 
 39. See id. at 772–73. 
 40. Id. at 772; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 29.45.390 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-101 
(2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-1005 (2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 75.14 (2012). 
 41. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 81A (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2401a(a)(2) 
(2012) (allowing for a tiered right of redemption with the shortest time period for abandoned properties). 
See also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-9-8.1 (West 2012) (allowing the taking of tax delinquent property 
“if deemed necessary for redevelopment, revitalization, or municipal purposes”). 
 42. Capitol Connection, supra note 1. 
 43. Id. 
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for a jurisdiction to be able to gain control of abandoned properties.44  
Multiple witnesses testified that not only is there an opportunity to 
mitigate the damage of abandoned properties with the bill, but also a 
chance to encourage economic development by avoiding the waste of 
having structures fall into disrepair while waiting for foreclosure; it was 
argued that instead that equity could be turned around and used as a 
commodity.  Though some legislators raised questions about the 
system’s constitutionality, Richard Cordray, the current director of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, asserted that the proposed 
legislation adequately accounted for all due process concerns.45 
The second important component of Ohio’s foreclosure evolution 
came with the signing of SB353, which allowed Ohio counties to form 
county land reutilization corporations (CLRC), also referred to as land 
banks, and allowed for a strict foreclosure on unoccupied, abandoned 
properties using the expedited foreclosure process. 
The original bill, SB353, only allowed Cuyahoga County, which 
contains the City of Cleveland, to create a CLRC.46  The Cuyahoga 
County Land Reutilization Corporation was meant to be experimental 
and the legislation included sunset provisions.  However due to the 
positive results achieved in Cleveland, HB313 of the 128th General 
Assembly repealed the sunset provisions and permitted other counties to 
create CLRCs.47 
E. Creation and Operation of a County Land Reutilization Corporation 
If a county contains a population greater than sixty thousand, it can 
elect to form a CLRC.48 Incorporated as a non-profit community 
improvement corporation by the county’s Treasurer, CLRCs are hybrid 
creatures overseen by a board of directors comprised mostly of elected 
officials but incorporated as separate from the county governments as 
quasi-public, quasi-private entities.49  Incorporating CLRCs as separate 
legal entities allows them more freedom to contract for services, 
purchase, and disposition, while not opening up the government to the 
liability that comes with dealing with and holding vacant, abandoned 
properties.50  The purpose of a CLRC is to facilitate the reclamation, 
 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Land Bank Expansion Draws Numerous Proponents, HANNAH REPORT (Dec. 2, 2009), 
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/NewsStory.aspx?id=181236.  
 47. Id. 
 48. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1724.04 (West 2012).  
 49. Id. §§ 1724.01, 1724.04.  For a full list of the statutorily-mandated composition of a CLRC’s 
board of directors, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1724.03(B) (West 2012). 
 50. Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Understanding Ohio’s Land Bank Legislation, FED. RESERVE 
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rehabilitation, and reutilization of vacant, abandoned, tax-foreclosed, or 
other real property within the county; efficiently hold and manage 
vacant, abandoned, or tax-foreclosed real property pending its 
reclamation, rehabilitation, and reutilization; assist governmental entities 
and other nonprofit or for-profit persons to assemble, clean, and clear 
the title of property described in this division in a coordinated manner; 
or promote economic and housing development in the county or 
region.51 
A CLRC has a blend of unique and normal corporate powers.  As an 
independent nonprofit corporation, a CLRC has all the regular powers of 
a corporation.52  These normal powers include the ability to negotiate 
financing for projects, contract for services, and dispose of property in a 
manner deemed best for the community.53  The freedom to dispose of 
properties below the fair market value allows a CLRC the freedom to 
negotiate with purchasers in nonfinancial terms.  For example, a CLRC 
can discount a property below the fair market value in order to secure 
the commitment from a developer to include low-income housing in a 
planned development or beautification of the streetscape. 
One of the unique powers of a CLRC is the ability to enter into an 
agency agreement with municipalities and townships where the CLRC 
will act as the jurisdiction’s agent in regards to code enforcement.54  Due 
to budget constraints and political repercussions, at times jurisdictions 
do not have the ability to quickly and strategically fund utilization of 
their police powers in order to stabilize a particular neighborhood or 
building.  This agency ability allows a CLRC to strategically utilize its 
own funds to step into the shoes of the local jurisdiction and be 
proactive about addressing problem properties, ensuring that a singular 
problem property does not destabilize the property values of an entire 
street. 
The most revolutionary power granted to CLRCs is the ability to 
foreclose on “unoccupied” property on which a county holds a tax lien.55  
 
BANK OF CLEVELAND (2009), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/PolicyDis/pdp25.pdf. 
 51. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1724.01(B)(2) (West 2012). 
 52. Id. § 1724.02. 
 53. Id. 
 54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1724.02(J) (West 2012). 
 55. Id. § 323.66(G)(1). 
“Unoccupied,” with respect to a parcel of abandoned land, means any of the following: 
(a) No building, structure, land, or other improvement that is subject to taxation and that 
is located on the parcel is physically inhabited as a dwelling; 
(b) No trade or business is actively being conducted on the parcel by the owner, a tenant, 
or another party occupying the parcel pursuant to a lease or other legal authority, or in a 
building, structure, or other improvement that is subject to taxation and that is located on 
the parcel; 
(c) The parcel is uninhabited and there are no signs that it is undergoing a change in 
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Through HB313 and its predecessor HB294, Ohio formed a unique 
blend of an efficient tax foreclosure process coupled with an 
organization that is removed from many cumbersome bureaucratic 
restraints and wholly committed to utilizing the new process to protect 
communities and spur economic development.  Found in Oh. Rev. Code 
§ 323.65 to § 323.79, this process is an expedited, administrative, strict 
foreclosure. 
The expedited and administrative aspects of the foreclosure process 
share the same rationale.  Among other things, as a result of an 
overloaded court system and the numerous local agencies involved in a 
tax foreclosure, using the judicial process took too long.  HB313 
sponsor, Representative Roland Winburn, stressed the importance of the 
expedited foreclosure process and how even the administrative process 
implemented in HB294 sometimes took months before a land bank 
could gain control.56 
The administrative foreclosure process involves a hearing in front of 
the county board of revision,57 a body generally utilized to hear 
complaints about the taxable value of property.58  Under the statute, a 
 
tenancy and remains legally habitable, or that it is undergoing improvements, as 
indicated by an application for a building permit or other facts indicating that the parcel 
is experiencing ongoing improvements; 
(d) In the case of delinquent vacant land, there is no permanent structure or improvement 
affixed on the land. 
(2) For purposes of division (G)(1) of this section, it is prima-facie evidence and a 
rebuttable presumption that may be rebutted to the county board of revision that 
abandoned land is unoccupied if, at the time the county auditor makes the certification 
under section 5721.011 of the Revised Code, the abandoned land is not agricultural land, 
and two or more of the following apply: 
(a) At the time of the inspection of the abandoned land by a county, municipal 
corporation, or township in which the abandoned land is located, no person, trade, or 
business inhabits, or is visibly present from an exterior inspection of, the abandoned 
land. 
(b) No utility connections, including, but not limited to, water, sewer, natural gas, or 
electric connections, service the abandoned land, or no such utility connections are 
actively being billed by any utility provider regarding the abandoned land. 
(c) The abandoned land is boarded up or otherwise sealed because, immediately prior to 
being boarded up or sealed, it was deemed by a political subdivision pursuant to its 
municipal, county, state, or federal authority to be open, vacant, or vandalized.  
OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 323.65(G) (West 2012). 
 56. Ronald Winburn, Representative, Senate Ways and Means And Economic Development 
Committee: Sponsor Testimony-House Bill 313 (Feb. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.rotundacollection.com/ShowDocument.aspx?TestimonyID=413 (“The majority of expedited 
HB 294 foreclosures were required to go through at least one auction before they could be transferred. 
Thus, properties acquired by passive land banks sometimes sat vacant for up to nine months after 
foreclosure and before being transferred to the program, allowing plenty of time for such properties to 
fall into disrepair or to be stripped by looters.”). 
 57. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 323.66 (West 2012). 
 58. Id. § 5715. 
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CLRC or a tax lien certificate holder could possibly utilize the 
administrative process.59  This could potentially include entities that 
purchase tax liens from the county; however, strict foreclosure under 
this process is not available to private third-party tax lien certificate 
holders.60  The hearing process is very similar to a judicial foreclosure.  
The foreclosure begins with a title search to identify all persons holding 
an interest in the property subject to foreclosure.61  The foreclosing party 
files a complaint with the local clerk of courts,62 who then serves all 
interest holders with the notice and complaint in the same method 
employed for judicial proceedings.63  No sooner than thirty days after 
the perfection of service, a board of revision will have a final hearing on 
the merits of the complaint.64  The owner or any other interest holder 
may only plead that the impositions shown in the complaint have been 
paid in full, the amount is invalid, service was insufficient, or the land is 
not abandoned.65  Property foreclosed under this process can be disposed 
of by sale or through direct transfer without sale.66 
A CLRC can seek strict foreclosure, in either a judicial or 
administrative foreclosure proceeding, through two methods.  For 
abandoned property where the taxes and other associated debts exceed 
the fair market value, as determined by the county auditor, a CLRC is 
able to request, after a foreclosure judgment, direct transfer of the 
property without sale.67  Additionally, in any foreclosure proceeding 
against abandoned lands, in a county in which a CLRC operates, the 
county treasurer or the treasurer’s agent in the proceeding may elect to 
invoke the alternative right of redemption.68  In an Ohio foreclosure-by-
sale proceeding, a property owner’s right of redemption continues until 
a court confirms the sale of the property.69  When the county treasurer 
elects to invoke the alternative right of redemption, the property owner, 
or lienholder,70 will have forty-five days from the journalization of 
foreclosure to redeem his or her property by paying the taxes owed to 
 
 59. Id. § 323.66(A) . 
 60. Id. § 323.78. 
 61. Id. § 323.68. 
 62. Id. § 323.69(A). 
 63. Id. § 323.69(B). 
 64. Id. § 323.70(A). 
 65. Id. § 323.72(A)(1). 
 66. Id. § 323.73. 
 67. Id. § 323.28(E).The same process is made available in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 323.71 
(West 2009).  
 68. Id. § 323.78. 
 69. Id. § 2329.33. 
 70. Any lienholder on the property has the ability to pay the tax debt to protect its interest. OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 323.45 (West 2011). 
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the county treasurer.  After the expiration of the alternative right of 
redemption period, the property can be transferred free of all 
encumbrances to a CLRC, a community development organization, a 
municipal corporation, a county, a township, or a school district.71 
 Strict foreclosure was included in order to ensure that land banks 
could acquire both positive and negative equity properties and because 
frequently the sale process adds months to the foreclosure process.72  
Furthermore, Attorney General Nancy Rogers supported the bill as a 
way to channel the potential profits of selling tax foreclosed properties 
into an organization committed to the well being of the community.73  
These profits can then be used to fund the operations of the land bank. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Current System’s Importance, Shortfalls, and Effects 
The ability to efficiently and effectively collect property taxes is 
crucial to the operation of local government, making up roughly twenty-
nine percent of all general revenues.74  However, one commonly used 
process, the judicial foreclosure by sale, has significant flaws that could 
be harming communities. 
 As previously mentioned, due to the nature of the assessment and 
collection of a property tax, these revenues comprise approximately 
seventy-five percent of all revenues raised solely by local jurisdictions.75  
At a time where state governments are cutting local government 
funding,76 property tax revenues become increasingly vital to the 
functioning of our most basic units of government.  Additionally, 
property tax revenues largely fund our public education system, 
 
 71. Id. § 323.78(B). 
 72. Senator Patton testified that “the change will allow the LRC to acquire both positive and 
negative equity properties, and the abandoned positive equity properties will be used to help fund the 
operations of the LRC through responsible resales to qualified homeowners and eligible rehabbers.” 
Capitol Connection Bill History for SB353 127th General Assembly, HANNAH CAPITOL CONNECTION 
(Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.rotundacollection.com/BillHistory.aspx?billnum=SB353&ga=17. 
 73. “Enabling the creation of Land Reutilization Corporations (LRC) as an alternative, whose 
primary interest is improving the neighborhoods, to obtain control of some of these properties will allow 
any proceeds from these transactions to go to the LRC and not those intent on exploitation.” Capitol 
Connection Bill History For SB353 127th General Assembly, HANNAH CAPITOL CONNECTION (Dec. 4, 
2008), http://www.rotundacollection.com/BillHistory.aspx?billnum=SB353&ga=17. 
 74. Alexander, supra note 5, at 775 n.30 (“Between 1979 and 1990, this percentage remained 
constant between 28.0% and 29.5%.”). 
 75. Id. at 755. 
 76. See Joane Huist Smith, Local Budgets to Lose Millions in Funding, DAYTON DAILY NEWS 
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/local-budgets-to-lose-millions-in-
funding/nMtkM/; see also Courtney Cutright, Local Schools Wonder About State Budget Cuts, 
ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/190338. 
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reportedly comprising ninety-seven percent of the revenues that school 
districts receive.77  The Supreme Court has long recognized the unique 
importance of the tax collection process to local and state governments. 
In Dows v. City of Chicago, the Court stated: 
It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the 
means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the 
utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce 
the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any 
delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is 
devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of 
government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.78 
Just as important as efficient collection is the preservation of property 
values in order to ensure that the revenues do not decline.  Vacant 
properties can have a devastating effect on the property values of 
adjacent properties.  One study in Philadelphia reported that property 
values within 150 feet of a vacant building decrease by an average 
$7,627.79  As property values decline, the risk of further abandonment 
and tax delinquency increases, further injuring the revenues of the local 
jurisdiction.80 
Currently the primary system of property tax enforcement employed 
in Ohio, judicial foreclosure, is not only ineffective, but it is enabling a 
cycle of delinquency and abandonment.  This cycle leads to declining 
property values and significant government expenditures, such as 
demolition costs. 
The following statistics are discerned from an analysis of the tax 
foreclosure process in Hamilton County, Ohio during 2011.81  The 
analysis took account of all properties that went to the Hamilton County 
Sheriff’s sale during 2011, as reported in the Cincinnati Court Index.82  
 
 77. Alexander, supra note 5, at 775. 
 78. Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. 108, 110 (1870). 
 79. RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY, BLIGHT FREE PHILADELPHIA (2001), available at 
http://astro.temple.edu/~ashlay/blight.pdf. 
 80. Alexander, supra note 5, at 756–57. 
 81. The data underlying these numbers can be seen in Attachment A.  The data was discerned 
from the records of the Cincinnati Court Index and the Hamilton County Auditor.  By looking at the 
reported Sheriff Sale results properties were recorded as receiving a bid or no bid.  If a property received 
a bid, the amount was recorded and the individual property was researched for information about 
subsequent transfers.  All properties that were not bid upon were reported by the foreclosure case 
number.  This process does not take into account properties that were withdrawn from the foreclosure 
process before reaching sale.  The next step was an analysis off the 2011 forfeited auction results.  In 
Hamilton County, the forfeited land sale is conducted in June of every year, so this particular auction 
did not include all the property reported on from the 2011 Sheriff’s sale.  Every parcel that was sold at 
the 2011 forfeited land sale was recorded with the total costs and taxes owed and compared with the 
purchase price at auction.  Then each individual parcel was researched for recent transfers and recent tax 
payments. 
 82. The Cincinnati Court Index publishes all the legal notices required by statute for the sale of 
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A total of 428 properties were offered for auction.83  Eighty-one 
properties reportedly received bids, but on only 73 properties were the 
taxes paid and a successful transfer resulted.84  Therefore, the total tax 
debt was collected on only 17.06% of the properties foreclosed upon and 
offered for sale.85 
Under Ohio law, after a tax foreclosure a property must be offered at 
auction twice.  If it does not sell at the second auction, it is forfeited to 
the state.86  In short, this means that the parcel will sit, free from further 
assessment of taxes,87 until the county auditor offers it for sale at another 
public auction.88  In Hamilton County, this auction is held annually in 
June.89  At the auction, the properties must first be offered at either the 
fair market value or the total amount owed.90  In practice, the properties 
are offered for the amount of the court’s finding in a foreclosure 
proceeding.  If the property does not receive a bid, the property is 
offered for “the best price obtainable.”91  In Hamilton County, the 
minimum bid for the second round starts at $5.00.92  In 2011, 780 
properties were offered for auction at the Forfeited Land Sale.93  225 
properties received bids.94  The total debt owed on the properties 
purchased, including the full amount of the foreclosure findings and the 
court costs, was $1.73 million dollars.95  The total collected was 
$226,810.00.96  The full debt owed was collected on only four 
properties.97  On many of the properties, the winning bid did not cover 
the court costs, let alone the tax debt.98  The $1.5 million dollar deficit is 
wiped from the tax records of the properties.  Even more startling is the 
fact that of the 225 properties purchased, 143 (63.5%) were already 
 
real property at a public auction.  See CINCINNATI COURT INDEX, http://www.courtindex.com/ (last 
visited June 3, 2013). 
 83. See infra Table 1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5723.01(A)(1) (West 2012). 
 87. Id. § 5723.02. 
 88. Id. § 5723.06. 
 89. HAMILTON CNTY. AUDITOR, http://www.hamiltoncountyauditor.org/tax_delinquent.asp (last 
visited June 3, 2013). 
 90. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5723.06(A)(1), 5721.16(A) (West 2012). 
 91. Id. § 5723.06(A)(2). 
 92. See infra Table 4. 
 93. See infra Table 3. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See infra Table 4. 
 98. See Id. 
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delinquent again by the next year.99  This suggests that the people 
purchasing land at auctions are not responsible property owners. 
Hamilton County suffers multiple losses in revenue from this process.  
For example, one loss is the amount of the tax debt that is uncollected.  
Additional losses include the future revenues not collected from the 
irresponsible purchasers, and the loss of tax revenue not collected as the 
forfeited property waited for auction.  Though a precise number may be 
hard to determine since there is a high correlation between tax 
delinquency and abandonment,100 the negative impact on property 
values throughout Hamilton County is likely to be substantial.  This 
reduction leads to diminishing overall revenues. 
As evidence of the cyclical nature of the problem, an analysis of 
properties sold in the 2006 Forfeited Land Sale show that 46.9% of the 
properties then sold are currently delinquent, many showing no property 
taxes having been paid for the past several years.101 Furthermore, some 
of the properties sold in 2006 have already been foreclosed upon again 
and resold at a subsequent Forfeited Land Sale.102 Therefore, another 
loss to the County is the judicial, prosecutorial, and administrative 
resources that go into a foreclosure proceeding. 
Hamilton County is not the only jurisdiction plagued with this 
inefficiency.  One study performed in St. Paul, Minnesota found that 
83% of what is owed is not collected in foreclosure.103 This number is 
very close to the 86% that went uncollected in the Hamilton County 
2011 Forfeited Land Sale.  Part of this ineffectiveness stems from the 
public auction mechanism itself.  In the most common type of auction 
employed for the sale of foreclosed property, generally, “[b]idders 
physically congregate in a single location.  They call their bids orally, so 
that each bidder is immediately aware of the bids of others.  Bids move 
progressively upward.  An individual may bid multiple times, and the 
sale is awarded to the highest bidder.”104  The auction itself is a quick 
process and only taking a few moments.  For foreclosure auctions 
conducted by private lenders this is seen as beneficial because it 
minimizes carrying costs, but the small benefits of the auction system 
are greatly outweighed by the inefficiencies. 
First, all interested persons must be physically present on the day of 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Frank S. Alexander, Property Tax Foreclosure Reform: A Tale of Two Stories, GA. BR. J., 
Dec. 1995, at 10, 11. 
 101. See infra Table 5. 
 102. See infra Table 6. 
 103. Edward G. Goetz, Kristin Cooper, Bret Thiele, & Hin Kin Lam, Pay Now or Pay More 
Later: St.Paul’s Experience in Rehabilitating Vacant Housing, CURA REPORTER, Apr. 1998, at 15. 
 104. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1416 (2004). 
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the auction.105  In a normal sale of real property, the pool of potential 
buyers is much larger because interested parties can inquire at their 
leisure.106  Additionally, it is difficult to obtain financing for a purchase 
at auction because there is no time for individual negotiation or 
thorough due diligence.107  This further limits the pool of potential 
purchasers. 
 Furthermore, auctions generally require a deposit from the successful 
bidder immediately subsequent the sale; plus, full payment of the 
purchase price within a short amount of time.108  For example, at a 
Hamilton County Sheriff’s Sale for tax foreclosed properties the 
successful bidder must write a personal check for the full amount 
immediately after the auction and return with a cashier’s check for the 
full payment by the end of the day.  This practice forces potential 
bidders to prearrange a method of payment even if ultimately 
unsuccessful at the auction.109  This eliminates most amateurs or one-
time-only purchasers from the auction.110 
Another factor that reduces the potential purchase price and the 
quality of purchaser is that usually there is no way for an interested 
party to view and assess a property.111  Therefore, bidders are forced to 
build in “worst-case estimates” of what it will cost to make the property 
useable.112  Most transactions involving the transfer of real property 
include a thorough inspection to determine the value of the property and 
any expected expenses that may be necessary after acquisition.  The risk 
associated with purchasing a property without an inspection turns away 
many potential buyers.113  As stated by one commentator: 
It is essential that buyers have adequate information about the 
property being sold if market price is to be achieved.  Sellers who 
use commercial auction sales recognize this fact, and generally 
provide very extensive disclosures of information, termed “bid 
packages,” to prospective bidders.  Such packages may include 
engineering and architectural reports on the buildings and their 
systems, detailed plans and surveys, environmental audits, and the 
like.  This information encourages higher bids because it tends to 
reduce the level of uncertainty that bidders experience.114 
 
 105. Id. at 1417. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1419. 
 108. Id. at 1419–20. 
 109. Id. at 1420. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1421. 
 112. Id. at 1420. 
 113. Id. at 1422. 
 114. Id. at 1421. 
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Lack of access and certainty affects the title of the property as well.  
Most buyers will want to know if there are any encumbrances on the 
property, but this will require the purchase of a title report before the 
auction.  Additionally, few title agencies will issue title insurance on the 
deed granted to a purchaser in a tax foreclosure auction.  Therefore, 
frequently a purchaser must undertake a quiet-title action in order to 
attain title insurance. 
In essence, the pool of potential buyers is boiled down to a very small 
number of professionals.  At the vast majority of mortgage foreclosure 
auctions, the lender is present and simply credit bids what it is owed and 
acquires title to the property.115  However, at tax foreclosure auctions 
there is generally no lender or lienholder present and often the pool of 
potential purchasers is solely comprised of prospectors.116 
The Ohio statutory revisions (collectively the Ohio Land Banking 
Statute) remedy many of the issues that are present if a foreclosed 
property is sold at public auction. 
First, by allowing a CLRC to take possession of properties much of 
the risk that is built into the auction system can be eliminated.  Once a 
CLRC has title to the property, the property can be properly assessed 
and inspected.  Prospective purchasers can perform their due diligence 
on the property and obtain financing if necessary.  This allows CLRCs 
to encourage more than just savvy prospectors to purchase tax-
foreclosed homes.  Instead, it is possible to encourage purchasers who 
will be owner-occupants to buy the once abandoned properties, rehab 
them, and begin stitching the fabric of the street or neighborhood back 
together. 
Second, a CLRC can include claw-back provisions in its agreements 
to transfer property that require a property owner to maintain the 
property and pay property taxes.  This is an important measure not 
available with the public auction system because it works to remove the 
problem property from a cycle of abandonment and neglect, putting it on 
a path to rehabilitation and use. 
Finally, with the combination of an efficient tax foreclosure system 
and an aggressive land bank the negative effects of tax delinquent and 
abandoned properties can be strategically utilized as a means to 
encourage economic development.  Allowing a land bank to gain control 
of properties quickly through the tax foreclosure process preserves the 
equity still left in the structures and allows the land bank to channel that 
equity into channels that will benefit the community.  This may mean 
 
 115. Id. at 1423. 
 116. In an interview with Sgt. Snow, the police officer in charge of foreclosure sales in Hamilton 
County, Ohio, he referred to these buyers as “his regulars” and even mentioned that they will “gang-up” 
on first-time auction attendees to dissuade them from returning. 
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assisting an organization committed to low-income housing, like Habitat 
for Humanity; allowing a young couple to purchase their first home, or 
to encourage a for-profit developer to undertake a development that will 
create jobs. 
B. Statutory Safeguards 
Though an expedited strict, administrative foreclosure may sound 
harsh, there are adequate safeguards in place to address the most 
significant policy concerns.  The statute is deftly crafted to reach only 
properties that pose serious problems to communities and have minimal 
reason for protection.  One common law safeguard that has its roots in 
England, is the property owner’s right of redemption.117  As referenced 
earlier, this right was created out of equity to blunt the harshness of the 
original mortgage system, which required conveyance of the fee to the 
mortgagee and accepted no excuses for late payment.118  Under the Ohio 
tax foreclosure process, a property owner still maintains his right of 
redemption.  The majority of the redemption period comes before the 
foreclosure process.  A property must be delinquent on property taxes 
for almost one full year before a foreclosure can begin.119  The right of 
redemption continues until either a sale at public auction is confirmed 
by the court, a foreclosure judgment is journalized against a property 
with a tax debt higher than the assessed value, or the 45-day alternative 
right of redemption period expires after a judgment of foreclosure.  
Therefore, the shortest possible redemption period would consist of the 
year the taxes are owed, but not paid; a period allowing for the County 
Auditor to compile a list of delinquent properties; ample time to perform 
a title search and other foreclosure preparations; and thirty days after 
proper service in the foreclosure case.120 
Furthermore, property owners are protected because many have the 
right to enter into a delinquent tax contract, in essence a payment plan, 
at any time before an adjudication of foreclosure.121  Any person who 
owns agricultural property or owns and resides in residential property, 
that is the subject to tax foreclosure, is entitled to at least one 
opportunity to enter into a delinquent tax contract.122  This contract is 
not supposed to exceed five years;123 however, for agricultural and 
 
 117. Wechsler, supra note 24, at 856.  
 118. Id. at 855–56. 
 119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.10 (West 2012). 
 120. Id. § 5721.10. 
 121. Id. § 323.31. 
 122. Id. § 323.31(A)(1).  
 123. Id. § 323.31(A)(4). 
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owner-occupied residential property a county treasurer may even allow 
subsequent tax contracts.124  This same protection is not guaranteed for 
residential property that the owner does not occupy or for commercial 
property.125 If the property owner defaults on the payment plan, then the 
delinquent taxes can be foreclosed upon.126 
However, even the tax-contract safeguard is not entirely necessary 
because the strict, administrative foreclosure process is only available 
for properties that are unoccupied or abandoned.127  This eliminates the 
policy concern surrounding evicting people out of their home through 
this process.  If someone legally occupies the home, and this is not 
restricted solely to the owner, then a foreclosure proceeding can only be 
performed in the judicial foreclosure by sale method. 
Additionally, there are procedural safeguards to remove cases 
inappropriate for the administrative foreclosure process.  For example, 
the record owner of the land or the United States government may opt-
out of the administrative foreclosure process simply by filing a motion 
with the county clerk requesting dismissal.128  The board must then 
dismiss the complaint and any future attempts at tax collection, until the 
owner sells or conveys his or her interest, must be pursued through the 
judicial foreclosure process.129  Furthermore, if the board of revisions 
determines that a case is too complex, the board may dismiss the case 
sua sponte.130 
Finally, there are adequate opportunities to appeal decisions of the 
administrative body hearing the foreclosure.  Any party to a 
administrative foreclosure proceeding has fourteen days after the 
termination of the right of redemption to file an appeal with the county 
court of common pleas.131  These appeals are de novo and new issues 
may be raised on appeal.132 
C. Administrative Foreclosure Processes Are Not New 
The policy concerns behind the adoption of the Ohio land banking 
statute are not new and have been recognized elsewhere, leading to the 
creation of similar processes.  For example, the federal government has 
 
 124. Id. § 323.31(A)(1). 
 125. Id. § 323.31(A)(2).  
 126. Id. §§ 323.31(A)(6)–(7). 
 127. Id. § 323.66. 
 128. .Id. § 323.70(B). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 323.69(D). 
 131. Id. § 323.79. 
 132. Id. 
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recognized many of the problems with judicial foreclosure and as a 
result has provided United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) with an alternative foreclosure process.  First 
provided in The Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, HUD 
was empowered to perform nonjudicial foreclosures, a simple process 
comprised of notice of default then a sale of the property, on properties 
on which it holds mortgages and preempt state statutory redemption 
protections.  The congressional findings promulgated in support of the 
legislation include: the concern that lengthy foreclosure processes lead 
to the degradation of the property, which in turn negatively impacts the 
surrounding community and quality of life of residents; furthermore, 
congress notes the overburdened court systems as an important factor to 
justify the procedure.133 
The Uniform Commercial Code, the (UCC), has long recognized the 
issues with holding rigid to antiquated, lengthy foreclosure processes 
and sales.  As a result, the UCC does not dictate the exact manner of 
disposition for goods, but instead calls for a “commercially reasonable 
sale.”134  The purpose of this flexibility is to attain a price that 
adequately reflects the fair market value.135  Furthermore, the UCC also 
allows, with the consent of the debtor, acceptance of the collateral by the 
lender in full or partial satisfaction of the debt.136  With the possibility 
 
 133. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3701 (West 2012): 
(a) The Congress finds that— 
(1) . . . . 
(2) long periods to complete the foreclosure of these mortgages under certain State laws 
lead to deterioration in the condition of the properties involved; necessitate substantial 
Federal management and holding expenditures; increase the risk of vandalism, fire loss, 
depreciation, damage, and waste with respect to the properties; and adversely affect the 
residents of the projects and the neighborhoods in which the properties are located; 
(3) these conditions seriously impair the Secretary’s ability to protect the Federal 
financial interest in the affected properties and frustrate attainment of the objectives of 
the underlying Federal program authorities, as well as the national housing goal of “a 
decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family”; 
(4) application of State redemption periods to these mortgages following their 
foreclosure would impair the salability of the properties involved and discourage their 
rehabilitation and improvement, thereby compounding the problems referred to in clause 
(3); 
(5) the availability of a uniform and more expeditious procedure for the foreclosure of 
these mortgages by the Secretary and continuation of the practice of not applying 
postsale redemption periods to such mortgages will tend to ameliorate these conditions; 
and 
(6) providing the Secretary with a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure will reduce 
unnecessary litigation by removing many foreclosures from the courts where they 
contribute to overcrowded calendars. 
 134. U.C.C. § 9-610 (2012). 
 135. Id. § 9-610, Cmt. 2. 
 136. Id. § 9-620. 
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that, in certain situations, this consent may be implied, the effect is 
essentially a nonjudicial, strict foreclosure.137 
Finally, many states already have tax foreclosure processes utilizing 
the same components found in the Ohio land bank law.  One example is 
Rhode Island.  Rhode Island provides what is in essence a strict 
foreclosure.138  The statute provides that a municipality or a 
municipality’s development agency may “take” tax-delinquent property 
that it determines is necessary for redevelopment, revitalization, or 
municipal purposes.139  These properties are subject to the statutory right 
of redemption, but if the property is abandoned the municipality may 
immediately file to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption.140  
Though this process is similar to the Ohio process, there are several 
significant differences that should be noted.  A majority of the process is 
undertaken by the municipality itself, utilizing different departments.  
This type of inter-department dependency generally adds bureaucratic 
hurdles to the process.  Additionally, the Ohio statute creates what are 
essentially county-wide redevelopment agencies, allowing the single 
CLRC’s operations to incorporate both the traditional inner city and 
usually the surrounding suburbs.  This breadth lends itself to more 
efficient operations and a better ability to organize systematic economic 
development and land reutilization. 
Connecticut provides an example of an expedited strict, limited-
judicial procedure for properties where the taxes are greater then the 
value of the property.141  The validity of the municipality’s claim is 
presumed and there are no pleadings, but instead a four month window 
allowed for anyone entitled to redeem to present a “bona fide 
defense.”142  If the property is not redeemed the title vests in the 
municipality, which is later free to retain the proceeds of any sale.143 
Iowa contains a procedure that completely omits the judiciary, but 
instead relies on a power of sale type foreclosure followed by an 
extended statutory right of redemption period.144  In short, the elements 
of nonjudicial or administrative strict foreclosures are scattered 
throughout the legal systems of the various states and the federal 
government. 
 
 137. Id. § 9-620(c)(2). 
 138. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-9-8.1 (2012). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. § 44-9-25.2. 
 141. CON. AGENCIES REGS §§ 12-182 (2012). 
 142. Id. §§ 12-183, 12-188. 
 143. Id. §§ 12-189, 12-195. 
 144. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 446.7, 447.9 (2012). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
With the passage of HB294 and HB313, the State of Ohio has created 
an exciting and powerful tool to enforce the payment of property taxes, 
to stabilize the property values of communities affected by vacant and 
abandoned homes, and to generate economic development opportunities. 
The data shows that the former system was broken and fed a cycle of 
decline, blight, and frequently demolition.  The resulting waste and 
degradation to homes was a loss to neighborhoods.  The resulting 
diminution in property values and property tax revenues was and 
continues to be a loss, even a major threat, to the functioning of local 
governments. 
The method adopted by Ohio provides adequate due process 
safeguards and adequately addresses the policy concerns rooted in 
protection of property rights and a person’s home.  These concerns are 
addressed by adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and specific 
statutory safeguards targeted at removing occupied, residential 
structures from the foreclosure process. 
By providing Ohio counties with a strict, administrative foreclosure 
process and a non-profit development agency to orchestrate the 
reutilization of vacant, abandoned, and blighted property, the Ohio 
legislatures have not created anything completely new.  But instead, 
they have utilized the procedural pieces found all over the United States 
and formed them into a unique product.  A product that will no doubt 
change the face of many Ohio cities in a very positive way. 
To borrow an analogy used by Justice Barndeis,145  Ohio is acting as a 
laboratory and the experiment is well underway.  Other states should 
look to Ohio’s efforts, learn from the successes and possible shortfalls, 
and employ similar legislation in an effort to improve their tax 









 145. New State Ice Co. v. Leibman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
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EXHIBITS 
Table 1 – 2011 Sheriff Sale Results 
Total Number of Properties that Went to Auction Received Bid No Bid 
428 81 347 
   
Percentage Receiving No Bids: 81.07%  
   
Taxes actually recovered on: 17.06%  
Table 2 – Data 
Date Case Name Parcel ID Sold Amount 
Date Re-
Sold Amount Auction/Resale Difference 
6-Jan-11       
Properties 
Sold A-1004721 595-0010-0065-00 14,200.00   0.00 
 A-1004955 036-0001-0242-00 4,801.76   0.00 
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     0.00  
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     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
     0.00  
20-Jan-11 A-1003486     0.00 
 A-1001859     0.00 
 A-1005783     0.00 
 A-1006711     0.00 
 A-1001924     0.00 
 A-0909395     0.00 
 A-1001863     0.00 
 A-1006802     0.00 
 A-1004395     0.00 
 A-1001872     0.00 
 A-1001886     0.00 
 A-1000389     0.00 
 A-1001867     0.00 
 A-1006769     0.00 
 A-1002725     0.00 
 A-1001211     0.00 
 A-1005876     0.00 
 A-1006770     0.00 
3-Feb-11 A-0901321 651-0049-0209-00 83,000.00 June, 2011 62,000.00 21,000.00 
 A-0910398 122-0003-0068-00 47,000.00 Sept, 2011 64,000.00 -17,000.00 
 A-1007388 602-0002-0320-00 19,000.00 Aug, 2011 23,000.00 -4,000.00 
 A-1005200 561-0002-0031-00 10,743.01 May, 2011 25,000.00 -14,256.99 
10-Feb-11 A-1003819     0.00 
 A-1002289     0.00 
 A-1001868     0.00 
 A-1001862     0.00 
 A-1006748     0.00 
 A-1001698     0.00 
 A-1006800     0.00 
 A-1006467     0.00 
 A-1001866     0.00 
 A-1001873     0.00 
 A-1005001     0.00 
 A-1003489     0.00 
 A-1003492     0.00 
 A-1005952     0.00 
 A-1006768     0.00 
 A-1002533     0.00 
24-Feb-11  A-1003487 52,100.00   0.00 
  A-1006517 65,000.00   0.00 
  A-1007721 30,100.00   0.00 
  A-1006516 32,000.00   0.00 
  A-1006526 60,100.00   0.00 
   A-1007704 9,072.14   0.00 
  A-1001686 8,675.32   0.00 
  A-1005977 8,000.00   0.00 
10-Mar-11 A-1002540     0.00 
 A-0908025     0.00 
 A-0909401     0.00 
 A-1005980     0.00 
 A-1005611     0.00 
 A-1006493     0.00 
 A-1000589     0.00 
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 A-1001923     0.00 
 A-1001864     0.00 
 A-1008004     0.00 
 A-1000788     0.00 
 A-1006683     0.00 
 A-1002287     0.00 
 A-1006083     0.00 
 A-1007818     0.00 
 A-1007705     0.00 
 A-1006677     0.00 
 A-1007736     0.00 
 A-1007825     0.00 
 A-0908565     0.00 
 A-1006082     0.00 
 A-1005604     0.00 
 A-0911555     0.00 
 A-1003451     0.00 
24-Mar-11  202-0032-0146-00 73,000.00   0.00 
  046-0A04-0103-00 34,523.05   0.00 
  057-0005-0156-00 12,391.70   0.00 
  215-0069-0112-00 5,765.25   0.00 
7-Apr-11 A-1004435     0.00 
 A-1001697     0.00 
 A-1002919     0.00 
 A-1002721     0.00 
 A-1001930     0.00 
 A-1008695     0.00 
 A-1006492     0.00 
 A-1004345     0.00 
 A-1005880     0.00 
 A-1004723     0.00 
 A-1003296     0.00 
 A-1002918     0.00 
 A-1007737     0.00 
 A-1006745     0.00 
 A-1003155     0.00 
 A-1002057     0.00 
 A-1002055     0.00 
 A-1001869     0.00 
 A-1002052     0.00 
 A-1005003     0.00 
 A-1006201     0.00 
 A-1006147     0.00 
 A-1007738     0.00 
 A-0904311     0.00 
14-Apr-11  117-0005-0213-00 29,533.55 Sept, 2011 40,000.00 -10,466.45 
  208-0B57-0018-00 45,000.00   0.00 
  530-0040-0142-00 15,228.41   0.00 
  591-0008-0134-00 13,500.00   0.00 
  527-0010-0100-00 14,703.38   0.00 
  598-0030-0083-00 12,700.00   0.00 
  510-0041-0295-00 35,000.00   0.00 
  205-0024-0077-00 7,241.37   0.00 
  195-0028-0195-00 6,373.47   0.00 
  510-0031-0303-00 14,000.00   0.00 
5-May-11  500-0213-0188-00 31,000.00   0.00 
  590-0372-0087-00 15,811.12 Dec, 2011 $180,000.00  -164,188.88 
12-May-11  069-0003-0120-00 16,631.02   0.00 
  241-0001-0208-00 7,680.08   0.00 
19-May-11 A-1005092 590-0413-0089-00 $100,000.00    0.00 
 A-1009536     0.00 
 A-1001865     0.00 
 A-1005005     0.00 
 A-1009537     0.00 
 A-1000961     0.00 
 A-1006494     0.00 
 A-1005975     0.00 
 A-1004339     0.00 
 A-1006878     0.00 
 A-1002059     0.00 
 A-1005947     0.00 
 A-1004398     0.00 
 A-1005808     0.00 
 A-1005807     0.00 
 A-1008964     0.00 
 A-1005601     0.00 
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26-May-11 A-0907283 582-0014-0424-00 12,961.35   0.00 
 A-1006488     0.00 
 A-1008810     0.00 
 A-1007703     0.00 
 A-1009404     0.00 
 A-1009702     0.00 
 A-1005946     0.00 
 A-1003291     0.00 
 A-1001884     0.00 
 A-0906588     0.00 
 A-0906590     0.00 
 A-0906211     0.00 
 A-1006141     0.00 
 A-1009451     0.00 
 A-0906584     0.00 
 A-0906585     0.00 
 A-1007819     0.00 
2-Jun-11 A-1001932 156-0055-0079-00 412,585.67   0.00 
 A-1001927 550-0252-0027-00 32,823.37   0.00 
 A-1008617 582-0008-0169-00 16,481.44 Jan, 2012 19,200.00 -2,718.56 
 A-1006736 598-0061-0036-00 50,000.00   0.00 
 A-1006602 064-0001-0229-00 14,100.00   0.00 
 A-1008698     0.00 
 A-1009701     0.00 
 A-1009602     0.00 
 A-1009552     0.00 
 A-1010333     0.00 
 A-1009912     0.00 
 A-1009794     0.00 
 A-1003447     0.00 
 A-1004999     0.00 
 A-1005599     0.00 
 A-1005609     0.00 
 A-1005881     0.00 
 A-1005942     0.00 
 A-1006142     0.00 
 A-1006496     0.00 
 A-1006732     0.00 
9-Jun-11 A-1002033     0.00 
 A-1006212     0.00 
 A-1001858     0.00 
 A-1006744     0.00 
 A-1004394     0.00 
 A-1011562     0.00 
 A-1005095     0.00 
 A-1006733     0.00 
 A-1006526     0.00 
 A-1008692     0.00 
 A-1005004     0.00 
 A-1009644     0.00 
 A-1005603     0.00 
 A-1100150     0.00 
 A-1005779     0.00 
 A-1009056     0.00 
 A-1007822     0.00 
16-Jun-11 A-1006734     0.00 
 A-1009392     0.00 
 A-1006594     0.00 
 A-1001731     0.00 
 A-1005930     0.00 
 A-1005090     0.00 
 A-1005600     0.00 
 A-1008614     0.00 
 A-1001565     0.00 
 A-1001923     0.00 
 A-1007741     0.00 
 A-1006718     0.00 
 A-1005796     0.00 
 A-1006199     0.00 
 A-1006798     0.00 
 A-1007740     0.00 
 A-1100536     0.00 
 A-1005931     0.00 
 A-1011608     0.00 
 A-1007823     0.00 
 A-1010338     0.00 
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 A-1011664     0.00 
 A-1006737     0.00 
 A-1100473     0.00 
 A-1008993     0.00 
 A-1008015     0.00 
 A-1008705     0.00 
 A-1100526     0.00 
 A-1100784     0.00 
 A-1100542     0.00 
 A-1100527     0.00 
 A-1011546     0.00 
 A-1009459     0.00 
 A-1006206     0.00 
23-Jun-11  248-0003-0034-00 65,000.00   0.00 
  094-0006-0063-00 3,972.99   0.00 
7-Jul-11 A-1006774 149-0014-0033-00 10,076.14   0.00 
 A-1007817 590-0392-0014-00 14,340.00   0.00 
 A-1005943 114-0001-0028-00 19,000.00   0.00 
 A-1007743 062-0001-0098-00 6,634.45   0.00 
 A-1006715 035-0005-0035-00 3,580.22   0.00 
 A-1008152     0.00 
 A-1009909     0.00 
 A-1009407     0.00 
 A-1007723     0.00 
 A-1008403     0.00 
 A-1009558     0.00 
 A-1005606     0.00 
 A-1100790     0.00 
 A-1009655     0.00 
 A-1007816     0.00 
21-Jul-11 A-1006743     0.00 
 A-1006804     0.00 
 A-1005882     0.00 
 A-1009461     0.00 
 A-1008694     0.00 
 A-1008704     0.00 
 A-1005094     0.00 
 A-1006762     0.00 
 A-1006599     0.00 
 A-1101710     0.00 
 A-1011613     0.00 
 A-1007042     0.00 
 A-1007742     0.00 
 A-1101356     0.00 
18-Aug-11  119-0002-0368-00 12,481.44   0.00 
  595-0012-0177-00 2,095.35   0.00 
  235-0003-0069-00 5,000.00   0.00 
  174-0009-0131-00 6,600.00 Feb, 2012 $18,000.00  -11,400.00 
9-Sep-11  612-0140-0248-00 40,000.00 Sep, 2012 $90,000.00  -50,000.00 
  219-0054-0025-00 7,518.20 June, 2012 $13,000.00  -5,481.80 
  603-0A23-0057-00 35,702.29 Aug, 2012 $300,000.00  -264,297.71 
  530-0040-0018-00 7,215.20   0.00 
22-Sep-11 A-1001882 243-0004-0056-00 11,100.00 Oct, 2012 $51,600.00  -40,500.00 
 A-1005797     0.00 
 A-1100733     0.00 
 A-1011536     0.00 
 A-1100549     0.00 
 A-1006207     0.00 
 A-1009566     0.00 
 A-9893851     0.00 
 A-1011548     0.00 
 A-1100281     0.00 
 A-1100283     0.00 
 A-1006597     0.00 
 A-1011606     0.00 
 A-1009651     0.00 
 A-1010337     0.00 
6-Oct-11 A-1102577 236-0002-0171-00 9,000.00   0.00 
 A-1101227 128-0001-0143-00 21,000.00 June, 2012 $115,000.00  -94,000.00 
 A-1101677 233-0003-0117-00 15,000.00 Sep, 2012 $10,000.00  5,000.00 
 A-1101680 115-0003-0109-00 14,000.00   0.00 
 A-1101736 520-0172-0348-00 27,100.00   0.00 
 A-1101809 134-0005-0064-00 22,961.67   0.00 
 A-1102750     0.00 
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 A-1100469     0.00 
 A-1103108     0.00 
 A-1103107     0.00 
 A-1106191     0.00 
 A-1006601     0.00 
 A-1006729     0.00 
 A-1006811     0.00 
 A-1008003     0.00 
 A-1008957     0.00 
 A-1008958     0.00 
 A-1009557     0.00 
 A-1009649     0.00 
 A-1011607     0.00 
 A-1100551     0.00 
 A-1100709     0.00 
 A-1103025     0.00 
 A-1102890     0.00 
 A-1004340     0.00 
 A-1103758     0.00 
20-Oct-11 A-1102889 065-0003-0013-00 5,532.07   0.00 
 A-1101578 057-0003-0114-00 5,064.25   0.00 
 A-1101542 641-0005-0055-00 13,100.00   0.00 
 A-1100531 204-0014-0104-00 7,979.55   0.00 
 A-1011561 590-0320-0624-00 4,943.57   0.00 
 A-1006521 500-0041-0245-00 17,444.77   0.00 
 A-1008758 630-0130-0084-00 30,500.00   0.00 
3-Nov-11 A-1103757 115-0004-0112-00 29,394.36 June, 2012 $40,000.00  -10,605.64 
 A-1103244     0.00 
 A-1102391     0.00 
 A-1101708     0.00 
 A-1101581     0.00 
 A-1101231     0.00 
 A-1009704     0.00 
 A-1006717     0.00 
 A-1006675     0.00 
8-Dec-11  608-0020-0044-00 50,000.00   0.00 
15-Dec-11  520-0271-0058-00 20,000.00   0.00 
  500-0171-0051-00 3,496.78   0.00 
  671-0001-0055-00 25,500.00   0.00 
22-Dec-11 A-1009911     0.00 
 A-1102191     0.00 
 A-1008990     0.00 
 A-1104867     0.00 
 A-1103493     0.00 
 A-1007754     0.00 
 A-1100553     0.00 
 A-1101678     0.00 
 A-1103646     0.00 
 A-1102613     0.00 
 A-1104621     0.00 
 A-1101684     0.00 
 A-1101739     0.00 
 A-1007720     0.00 
 A-1009711     0.00 
 A-1100729     0.00 
29-Dec-11 A-1008959 175-0016-0027-00 4,924.49   0.00 
 A-1101529 125-0003-0077-00 91,000.00   0.00 
 A-1100470 128-0003-0015-00 16,477.70   0.00 
 A-1008622 211-0067-0088-00 23,000.00   0.00 
 A-1100789 117-0A07-0430-00 24,300.00   0.00 
 A-1101815 590-0392-0243-00 12,400.00   0.00 
 A-1002922 510-0360-0508-00 9,201.72   0.00 
 A-1104579     0.00 
 A-1100471     0.00 
 A-1100528     0.00 
 A-1100698     0.00 
 A-1102887     0.00 
 A-1006809     0.00 
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Table 3 – 2011 Forfeited Land Sale Results 
Total Costs/Taxes Owed 1,733,384.19 
Total Monies Collected 226,810.00 
Total Gain/Loss 1,506,574.19 
  
Total Number Sold: 225 
Number Delinquent By the Next Year: 143 
Percentage Delinquent the Next Year: 63.56% 
 
 












0124-00 $10,348.59  $75.00 $10,273.59 $2,500.00 -$2,425.00 2/10/12  
029-0002-
0050-00 $9,510.64  $5.00 $9,505.64  $0.00   
031-0005-
0070-00 $6,821.39  $5.00 $6,816.39 $7,500.00 -$7,495.00 6/20/12  
031-0005-
0071-00 $2,357.03  $5.00 $2,352.03 $7,500.00 -$7,495.00 6/20/12  
034-0002-
0038-00 $9,011.77  $2,000.00 $7,011.77  $0.00   
034-0005-
0071-00 $3,490.61  $5.00 $3,485.61  $0.00   
035-0002-
0020-00 $7,695.44  $9,000.00 $1,304.56  $0.00   
035-0002-
0101-00 $10,354.18  $27,000.00 $16,645.82  $0.00   
035-0003-





0127-00 $21,651.93  $21,000.00 $651.93  $0.00   
036-0004-
0169-00 $12,609.00  $5.00 $12,604.00 $5,000.00 -$4,995.00 10/17/11  
037-0003-





0067-00 $2,567.26  $5.00 $2,562.26  $0.00   
037-0003-
0090-00 $10,531.48  $5,300.00 $5,231.48  $0.00   
037-0003-

























0156-00 $18,528.47  $1,450.00 $17,078.47  $0.00   
055-0004- $12,841.21  $200.00 $12,641.21  $0.00  No taxes 
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0004-00 paid since 
transfer. 
055-0004-
0020-00 $15,411.62  $2,750.00 $12,661.62 $6,000.00 -$3,250.00 8/24/12  
057-0003-
0081-00 $9,056.36  $7,050.00 $2,006.36  $0.00   
057-0003-
0089-00 $5,802.06  $4,800.00 $1,002.06 $10,000.00 -$5,200.00 1/6/12  
057-0003-




















0026-00 $4,522.86  $805.00 $3,717.86 $8,500.00 -$7,695.00 8/9/12  
058-0005-













0088-00 $1,107.58  $200.00 $907.58  $0.00   
060-0004-
















0275-00 $5,711.35  $100.00 $5,611.35  $0.00   
068-0002-
0266-00 $4,142.57  $5.00 $4,137.57  $0.00   
068-0003-





0066-00 $5,922.98  $1,560.00 $4,362.98  $0.00   
069-0002-





0133-00 $1,875.84  $5.00 $1,870.84  $0.00   
072-0002-













0048-00 $5,352.66  $5,000.00 $352.66  $0.00   
092-0004-
0155-00 $17,598.28  $5.00 $17,593.28 $5,000.00 -$4,995.00 9/7/11  
093-0002-





0101-00 $6,618.09  $100.00 $6,518.09  $0.00   
094-0005-
0097-00 $3,585.99  $25.00 $3,560.99  $0.00   
094-0005-





0132-00 $4,171.75  $900.00 $3,271.75 $1,000.00 -$100.00 8/19/11  
094-0005-
0133-00 $4,888.29  $300.00 $4,588.29 $1,000.00 -$700.00 8/19/11  
094-0005-
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transfer. 
094-0005-















0249-00 $7,433.69  $1,250.00 $6,183.69  $0.00   
094-0008-
0043-00 $4,120.73  $575.00 $3,545.73 $10,000.00 -$9,425.00 3/1/12  
095-0002-









0095-00 $1,970.37  $5.00 $1,965.37  $0.00   
095-0004-
0109-00 $7,598.56  $5.00 $7,593.56  $0.00   
095-0004-
0113-00 $1,721.36  $5.00 $1,716.36  $0.00   
095-0004-
0118-00 $1,753.77  $5.00 $1,748.77  $0.00   
095-0004-
0118-00 $7,392.31  $405.00 $6,987.31  $0.00   
096-0003-























0351-00 $8,413.54  $2,500.00 $5,913.54  $0.00   
105-0003-




























0267-00 $86,422.97  $15,100.00 $71,322.97  $0.00   
131-0006-
0238-00 $16,889.86  $1,500.00 $15,389.86 $5,000.00 -$3,500.00 11/8/11  
132-0002-
0150-90 $41,813.11  $5.00 $41,808.11  $0.00   
132-0003-





0039-00 $2,182.46  $5.00 $2,177.46  $0.00   
132-0003-










0045-00 $1,855.80  $5.00 $1,850.80 $9,440.00 -$9,435.00 5/8/12  
155-0047- $2,135.28  $5.00 $2,130.28  $0.00  No taxes 
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0073-00 paid since 
transfer. 
157-0060-
0046-00 $9,999.41  $50.00 $9,949.41  $0.00   
158-0061-
0013-00 $1,563.45  $5.00 $1,558.45  $0.00   
158-0061-









0016-00 $1,463.08  $5.00 $1,458.08  $0.00   
159-0064-





0017-00 $7,158.51  $400.00 $6,758.51  $0.00   
161-0003-
0020-00 $3,119.42  $200.00 $2,919.42  $0.00   
163-0004-






































0173-00 $11,672.73  $5.00 $11,667.73  $0.00   
171-0012-
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171-0012-













































0039-00 $3,846.69  $5.00 $3,841.69  $0.00   
175-0013-





0130-00 $10,804.97  $1,900.00 $8,904.97  $0.00   
175-0016-
0155-00 $1,500.39  $5.00 $1,495.39 $2,800.00 -$2,795.00 3/9/12  
175-0018-









0060-00 $15,739.90  $2,305.00 $13,434.90  $0.00   
177-0037-













0285-00 $14,397.45  $2,250.00 $12,147.45  $0.00   
184-0003-





0092-00 $1,733.50  $125.00 $1,608.50 $100.00 $25.00 9/13/12  
184-0005-
0154-00 $5,937.51  $5.00 $5,932.51 $3,000.00 -$2,995.00 9/18/12  
187-0008-





0023-00 $13,707.58  $1,230.00 $12,477.58  $0.00   
192-0065-





0067-00 $8,187.11  $105.00 $8,082.11 $2,980.00 -$2,875.00 8/24/12  
194-0009-
0180-00 $1,712.25  $5.00 $1,707.25  $0.00   
194-0009-
0181-00 $1,678.25  $5.00 $1,673.25  $0.00   
194-0009-
0183-00 $1,883.88  $75.00 $1,808.88  $0.00   
194-0009-
0200-00 $616.95  $5.00 $611.95  $0.00   
194-0010-
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194-0011-















0192-00 $626.44  $5.00 $621.44  $0.00   
195-0032-
0055-00 $9,869.38  $5.00 $9,864.38  $0.00   
200-0A48-






























0360-00 $3,449.79  $5.00 $3,444.79  $0.00   
202-0032-
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0164-00 $5,932.72  $1,710.00 $4,222.72  $0.00   
206-0008-





0059-00 $12,259.90  $10,700.00 $1,559.90  $0.00   
207-0052-
0048-00 $5,734.81  $6,500.00 $765.19  $0.00   
207-0054-
0101-00 $10,433.72  $1,800.00 $8,633.72  $0.00   
212-0065-














0014-00 $9,812.34  $5.00 $9,807.34  $0.00   
221-0019-
0163-00 $5,167.02  $250.00 $4,917.02 $5,000.00 -$4,750.00 9/24/12  
221-0020-




















0107-00 $16,708.35  $10,000.00 $6,708.35  $0.00   
590-0221-
0508-00 $17,099.45  $800.00 $16,299.45  $0.00   
590-0350-


















































0145-00 $16,730.93  $3,950.00 $12,780.93  $0.00   
592-0022-
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594-0020-






0028-00 $8,844.01  $100.00 $8,744.01 $2,600.00 -$2,500.00 9/9/11  
594-0050-
0296-00 $2,199.14  $5.00 $2,194.14  $0.00   
600-0011-





1283-00 $681.41  $5.00 $676.41 $390.00 -$385.00 3/12/12  
600-0094-
0001-00 $2,978.84  $500.00 $2,478.84  $0.00   
608-0007-





0328-00 $3,584.17  $500.00 $3,084.17  $0.00   
608-0008-





0365-00 $1,580.42  $200.00 $1,380.42  $0.00   
621-0006-








0010-00 $4,748.35  $25.00 $4,723.35  $0.00   
641-0004-
0226-00 $1,747.34  $5.00 $1,742.34  $0.00   
651-0020-





0110-00 $36,126.45  $5.00 $36,121.45  $0.00   
661-0002-
0007-00 $6,093.95  $5.00 $6,088.95  $0.00   
661-0002-
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